徐伟钧：知事更替，日本冲绳军事部署将提速？

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导语：9月13日，一场可能牵动地区安全格局的知事选举在日本冲绳落幕。获自民党支持的42岁那霸市前副市长古谢玄太击败寻求三连任的玉城丹尼，这是自2014年以来，自民党支持的候选人首次当选。

冲绳岛位于琉球群岛中部，集中了大量驻日美军基地，与中国周边安全及台海局势紧密相连。对于如何减轻驻日美军造成的负担，冲绳县政府与东京一直争执不下——围绕美军驻冲绳的重要基地普天间机场，现任冲绳知事玉城丹尼要求将其迁出冲绳，而新当选的古谢则支持东京提出的方案，将基地迁至冲绳县内的边野古。有分析人士指出，近年日本已在持续加强西南诸岛军事部署，推进与美军的协同，冲绳知事的更替将改变这些政策在当地落实的条件，进而影响日美在东海、台海方向的军事行动能力。

对此，IPP副研究员徐伟钧在接受媒体采访时指出，古谢玄太的当选将大幅削弱冲绳县政府对日本中央政府军事部署的地方制衡，为西南诸岛军事化和日美战备整合扫清部分地方层面的障碍。如果其竞选立场落实为具体施政措施，既有部署计划将有可能加速落地，日本西南防卫建设与日美联合作战安排也将更容易衔接。但徐伟钧同时也强调，获得自民党支持并不等于古谢会自然推行全面反华路线。中国可以与新一届县政府建立正常的工作联系，并将冲绳议题的讨论重点从强调央地对立，转向聚焦军事建设本身带来的社会后果。

记者：失去玉城丹尼这一频频释放和平信号的关键通道后，自民党支持的古谢玄太当选，对中国的涉冲绳（琉球）政策会有怎样的实质冲击？中国同冲绳的地方外交空间是否会大幅收缩？

古谢玄太（中）在媒体预测他在冲绳县知事选举中胜出后，与支持者一起庆祝。图源：法新社

徐伟钧：古谢玄太当选会显著削弱中国通过冲绳地方政治牵制日本政府的既有基础，直接冲击中方涉冲绳相关政策。

一者，中国将失去一个较愿意以地方政府名义公开强调对话、反对美军基地扩张的交往对象。玉城丹尼的价值既在于其相对温和的对华姿态，也在于其知事身份能够赋予相关主张以代表地方民意的属性。古谢如果减少这类政治性表态，即便中国和冲绳之间的一般性交流仍能维持，通过县政府产生的政治影响也将明显下降。

9月13日，冲绳县知事玉城丹尼支持者鞠躬。玉城任内积极推动对华“地域外交”，2023年曾访问中国，并主张通过对话避免冲绳卷入地区军事冲突。图源：日本时报

二者，东京与冲绳之间的政策分歧将会收窄。自民党支持的古谢上台后，冲绳地方政府对美军基地以及日本军事建设的抵触将会明显降低，日本中央与地方在冲绳相关事务上也将更容易进行政策协调。

三者，中方很难继续使用“冲绳民意普遍反对日美安全安排”的叙事。玉城向来以反对普天间移设闻名，古谢的胜利虽不能证明冲绳民众全盘支持所有军事部署，但至少说明，不反对移设的候选人同样可以获得多数选票。冲绳民意的这一变化，使得中方此前援引冲绳民意批评日美军事活动的论述失去了一部分现实支撑。

古谢曾担任总务省官僚，并在2022年以自民党公认、公明党推荐的身份参加参议院议员选举，与自民党政府有着较为密切的联系。此次选举中得到自民党倾力支持的背景，意味着古谢未来在处理对华交往时，可能会更加顾及日本中央政府的政策立场，同时有意避免日本国内关于“中国利用地方交流施加政治影响”的质疑。他很可能降低带有明显政治象征意义的互访规格，并在涉及琉球叙事、台湾问题及日美基地安排等事项上，为地方涉华活动划定更严格的参与边界。

不过，获得自民党支持并不等于古谢会自然推行全面反华路线。这次他能够胜出，关键在于抓住了冲绳民众对经济问题的关注。在竞选过程中，他也把扩大旅游消费、强化机场功能、吸引海外航线列为政策重点。这意味着其施政仍然需要维系与中国之间的经贸纽带，也仍具有推进对华旅游、商业和文化合作的意愿。

共同社调查显示，冲绳选民的关注重点仍明显向经济议题倾斜，“振兴经济”占49.5%，远高于“基地问题”的20.9%。图源：共同社

记者：鉴于古谢玄太在基地移设与民用港空“特定利用”上的相对配合态度，这是否会加速日本西南诸岛要塞化与日美战备整合？

徐伟钧：古谢当选将大幅削弱冲绳县政府对日本中央政府军事部署的地方制衡，为西南诸岛军事化和日美战备整合扫清部分地方层面的障碍。与玉城丹尼坚持反对边野古移设、对扩大军事利用保持警惕的路线相比，古谢不反对移设，并倾向于通过与中央政府合作推动地方经济振兴。这一变化意味着冲绳县政府的角色将发生转变，从日本国家安全政策在地方落实过程中的主要反对力量，转变为更愿意协商并提供配合的行政主体。

如果其竞选立场落实为具体施政措施，日本在西南方向推进军事建设所面临的政治阻力、央地协调成本和实施不确定性都将明显下降，从而推动既有部署计划加速落地。日美联合指挥、共同训练和任务协同主要由两国中央政府及军事机构决定，但这些安排能否顺利转化为实际应对能力，仍离不开地方在交通运输、设施使用和行政事务等方面的支持。随着冲绳县政府配合度的提高，日本西南防卫建设与日美联合作战安排将更容易衔接，相关基础设施也更容易从单纯的建设项目转化为可持续使用的后勤保障能力。

日本首相高市早苗与防卫大臣小泉进次郎在东京举行的自卫队高级干部会议上检阅仪仗队。图源：AFP

记者：面对冲绳民意转向重视经济、淡化基地抗争的现实，您认为中国未来应如何调整对冲绳的地域交往与策略布局？

徐伟钧：冲绳民众重视经济实际上具有双向政治效果。在和平环境下，这可能促使他们支持与东京合作、争取中央的财政扶持和资源倾斜。但如果军事活动开始明显干扰旅游、渔业、交通，或者战争风险变得具体，同样的经济利益考量又可能转化为制约军事化进程的社会压力。就此而言，古谢的当选并不意味着冲绳的民意已经转向支持自身成为对华对抗的前沿阵地。

日本陆上自卫队计划在南西诸岛演习期间，将88式地对舰导弹发射车部署至冲绳县石垣岛。石垣岛距台湾约240公里。图源：路透社

首先，中国完全可以与古谢领导的新一届县政府建立正常的工作联系，不宜仅凭其获得自民党支持的政治背景，就将其视为无法交往的对象。古谢强调提高居民收入、扩大旅游消费和吸引海外航线，说明其施政需要取得经济成果，也存在继续开展对外合作的动力。他在美军基地问题上配合东京，与其愿意在商业、文化等领域同中国开展合作并不矛盾，二者可以同时成立。不过，中方也需要明确底线，强调经贸关系需要建立在冲绳方面尊重中国核心利益的基础之上。

其次，中方对冲绳议题的运用，可由过去侧重强调中央与地方对立，转向聚焦军事建设本身带来的社会后果。玉城任内，冲绳县政府公开反对边野古移设，中方的相关论述自然可以按照“地方反对而中央强推”的逻辑展开。古谢当选后，这一叙事的适用空间将收窄。中国若继续将县政府与东京描述为全面对立的两端，就难以契合新的政治现实，也会削弱自身论述的说服力。

因此，未来中方的官方表态及相关媒体评论，应更多讨论军事部署本身带来的后果，例如民用设施被军事利用、演习训练活动对日常生活的干扰、环境破坏风险、居民安全风险和危机升级风险等。中方的重点应放在相关安排将会增加当地负担、加剧地区紧张局势，并对冲绳居民的生命财产安全构成直接威胁，由此更好地唤起冲绳民众的反战情绪。

徐伟钧 华南理工大学公共政策研究院副研究员

本次采访的部分观点于9月16日刊登于《南华早报》，原标题为“How will the Okinawa governor’s race result reshape China’s local messaging?”。

以下为《南华早报》原英文报道，供读者了解相关背景并作对照参考。（上下滑动查看）。

The leadership change in Okinawa could deal a quiet blow to Beijing’s attempts to leverage local opposition to remilitarisation and the US-Japan military alliance, according to analysts.

They added that the shift would compel Chinese academics and state media to recalibrate their messaging and approach towards the strategically vital Japanese prefecture.

Genta Koja, the 42-year-old backed by Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party to become Okinawa’s new governor, defeated incumbent Denny Tamaki on Sunday. This brought an end to eight years of Tamaki’s leadership, characterised by vocal pacifism and active regional diplomacy with Chinese cities that historically maintained ties with Okinawa.

For Beijing, which has long cultivated relationships with Okinawan leaders who challenge Tokyo’s defence policies, Koja’s win represents the loss of a sympathetic subnational partner.

Analysts said the election result served as a reality check for China’s external messaging, requiring it to adjust its approach towards Okinawan voters who were prioritising bread-and-butter issues over opposition to American military bases.

Okinawa prefecture is made up of around 40 inhabited islands and has a population of 1.5 million. It hosts roughly 70 per cent of all US military facilities in Japan despite accounting for less than 1 per cent of the country’s land area.

The United States seized Okinawa from Japan after World War II. Washington returned administrative control of the islands to Tokyo in 1972, but it has maintained a substantial military presence that serves as a crucial node in checking Beijing’s regional ambitions.

Before Japan annexed it in 1879, Okinawa was known as the Ryukyu Kingdom, an independent maritime kingdom that paid tribute to China during the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties.

In July 2023, Tamaki visited Beijing as part of a Japanese trade delegation and paid respects at the historic Ryukyu Kingdom cemetery in Beijing’s Tongzhou district.

Concerns have grown in Japan that Beijing may play the “Ryukyu card” – invoking the islands’ history to question Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa and counter Tokyo’s position on Taiwan.

Positioned within the “first island chain”, which stretches along the East Asian coastline from the Kuril Islands down to Borneo, Okinawa acts as a barrier limiting the People’s Liberation Army’s access to the Pacific Ocean. It is expected to play a vital strategic role in the event of a Taiwan conflict.

In addition to the American presence, Japan’s Self-Defence Forces have been expanding their deployments in Okinawa as part of Tokyo’s “southwest shift” – a defence strategy that bolsters the region with new missile systems, radar installations and troop deployments.

Tamaki firmly opposed the construction of new American military facilities on Okinawa Island and also opposed a plan to relocate the US Marine Corps’ Futenma air station in southern Okinawa to the Henoko coastal area in the north. Koja supports this controversial plan but has also called on Tokyo to provide a clearer timeline on when the Futenma station will close.

For decades, local Okinawans have protested against the American military presence, with residents long complaining of noise pollution, security risks and recurring cases of sexual assault by US servicemen.

Xu Weijun, an associate research professor at the Institute of Public Policy at South China University of Technology in Guangzhou, said that with Tamaki’s exit, China would lose an important interlocutor who could speak on behalf of the prefectural government to “publicly emphasise dialogue and oppose the expansion of US military bases”.

“Koja’s victory could weaken the leverage Beijing has long relied on to constrain Tokyo through Okinawa’s local politics,” he said.

Xu noted that Koja would be far more mindful of Tokyo’s foreign policy stance and would be likely to scale back reciprocal visits to China that carried obvious political symbolism.

He is also expected to draw stricter boundaries on local matters that concern Beijing, such as the Ryukyu narrative, Taiwan and Japan-US military base arrangements, according to Xu.

In recent years, Chinese state media have played up the historical ties between China and the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom while emphasising tensions between Okinawa residents and the US military.

Chinese academics and state media have even suggested challenging Tokyo’s control of Okinawa. While Beijing has not openly done so, state media have increasingly called for more research into historical and legal claims over the islands.

Xu said that following Tamaki’s defeat, it would be difficult for Chinese media and intellectuals to continue using the narrative that Okinawans generally opposed US-Japan security arrangements. Koja’s victory at least showed that a candidate who did not oppose the air station’s relocation could still win, he added.

“This shift can weaken the credibility and factual foundation of China’s previous narrative, which relied on invoking Okinawan public opinion to criticise Japan-US military activities.”

Xu suggested that Beijing should shift from emphasising the divergence between the prefectural government and Tokyo to focusing on the social consequences of the military build-up.

“China’s focus should be on how these arrangements increase the local burden, exacerbate regional tensions and pose threats to the lives and property of Okinawan residents,” he said.

Wang Guangtao, deputy director of the Centre for Japanese Studies at Fudan University, cautioned against overstating the impact of the election on China’s approach.

“China does not have a formal Okinawa policy in official diplomatic terms, and the change in Okinawa’s leadership may not constitute a shock to existing policy from Chinese cities that have civilian exchanges with Okinawa,” he said.

“During Tamaki’s tenure, he maintained relatively friendly communication channels with China at both the central and local levels. How Okinawa now adjusts and develops its relationship with China will certainly be a test for the incoming governor.”

Yet Koja’s victory signals a recalibration of Okinawan priorities that may still offer Beijing room for regional engagement.

Exit polls conducted by Kyodo News showed that only 21 per cent of voters prioritised issues related to US military bases, while nearly 50 per cent chose economic revitalisation when deciding who to vote for. Over half of the respondents said they supported the Futenma relocation.

During the campaign, Koja pledged to double Okinawa’s average income – which remains among the lowest of all prefectures – expand the local government budget for childcare and increase tourist spending on the island.

According to Xu, Koja’s success stemmed from tapping into Okinawa residents’ economic anxieties.

“This suggests that his administration will still need to preserve commercial ties with China and remain open to advancing tourism, business and cultural cooperation,” he said.

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华南理工大学公共政策研究院（IPP）是一个独立、非营利性的知识创新与公共政策研究平台。IPP围绕中国的体制改革、社会政策、中国话语权与国际关系等开展一系列的研究工作，并在此基础上形成知识创新和政策咨询协调发展的良好格局。IPP的愿景是打造开放式的知识创新和政策研究平台，成为领先世界的中国智库。