媒体关注｜IPP专家：中美的北极关系，已进入“深水区”

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导语：进入2026年，北极地区延续气候升温态势，随之升高的，还有围绕北极的地缘政治热度。据报道，美国正寻求进入格陵兰岛南部新建3处军事基地，并提出将其作为“美国主权领土”。美方还宣称，这些基地的主要任务是监视俄罗斯和中国在北大西洋的海上活动，重点覆盖格陵兰、冰岛与英国之间的“GIUK缺口”海域，即连接北大西洋与北冰洋航道的关键战略水域。与此同时，随着北极海冰消融，资源开发和基础设施建设的战略价值也随之凸显。随着北极被更多纳入大国竞争视野，中国如何在坚持“近北极国家”定位参与北极事务的同时，避免科研、航运和基础设施合作被过度安全化？

2026年5月7日，《南华早报》（South China Morning Post）刊发全版深度报道，关注北极航道开放、中美北极竞争与合作前景等议题，IPP荣誉教授梅赫里·马达尔沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）和IPP副研究员李品保应邀接受采访，并分享观察与分析。

美国总统特朗普对中国进行历史性访问之际，正值伊朗战争扰乱全球能源供应、加剧经济不确定性并给华盛顿与北京的关系带来新的压力。在本系列文章的最新一篇中，我们将探讨竞争、相互依存和地缘政治危机如何重塑美中两国关系，并将目光聚焦于北极这一竞争舞台。

北极地区正在升温，无论是在物理层面还是在地缘政治层面。

随着北极变暖加速，海冰减少到历史最低或接近历史最低水平，该地区对航运和资源开采变得更加便利——这也加剧了大国之间的竞争。

预计中美在极地地区的竞争将会加剧，但分析人士表示，“务实的”合作仍然是必要的，而且可能变得更加重要。

霍尔木兹海峡危机、也门胡塞武装为声援加沙而袭击红海航运，甚至2021年因货船搁浅而导致苏伊士运河暂时关闭等事件，都凸显了北极作为潜在替代海上航道的重要性。

受气候变化影响，冰层融化，格陵兰周边水域的航运通道正在逐步开放。海水变暖也可能带来新的矿产资源开发机会。图源：BBC

然而，日益激烈的中美竞争也引发了人们的担忧，即前苏联领导人米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫曾称之为“和平区”（zone of peace ）的地区，可能正在成为华盛顿和北京之间战略竞争的新前沿。

除了航运之外，该地区在科学研究、基础设施建设和资源开采方面也变得更加便利，但华南理工大学公共政策研究所名誉教授梅赫里·马达尔沙希表示，这可能会加剧竞争和不信任。

“中美在北极地区关系的未来走向很可能受到一个悖论的影响：气候变化在物理上打开了该地区，但在政治上却将其关闭，”她说。

北京大学深圳研究生院去年九月发表的一项研究预测，到2100年，北极可以支持所有主要船舶类型的全年航行，从而使不同的跨洋航线能够处理比苏伊士运河或巴拿马运河更大比例的全球航运交通。

北京在2018年的一份白皮书中明确了北极未来的重要性，将中国描述为该地区的“重要利益攸关方”和“近北极国家”。中国也一直在稳步扩大其在极地地区的治理和科学考察中的作用。

2018年1月26日，中国国务院新闻办公室发表《中国的北极政策》白皮书，这是中国首次就北极政策发表白皮书。

同年，它与包括美国在内的其他九个缔约方合作，缔结了具有里程碑意义的《防止中北冰洋不管制公海渔业协定》。

该条约是世界上第一个具有法律约束力的多边文书，旨在防止在公海区域开始商业捕鱼，也是北京在北极地区决策中拥有平等发言权的唯一国际机制。

中国还是北极理事会的观察员，没有投票权。自2022年俄罗斯（北极理事会的八个成员国之一）对乌克兰发动全面入侵以来，北极理事会一直处于停滞状态。

3月下旬，中国在东部城市杭州主办了渔业协定科学协调小组会议，中国政府称此举“提升了其在北极事务中的参与度”。

北京还希望在“极地丝绸之路”框架下开发更多航运路线和基础设施，这是其跨大陆“一带一路”倡议的一部分。

马达尔沙希表示，华盛顿会谨慎对待让中国等非北极国家在地区事务中发挥更大作用的问题。

“随着信任度的下降，科学存在可能会从安全角度来看待，”她说道，并认为研究站、破冰船、海底测绘和数据收集也可能具有更广泛的战略意义。

她还表示，美国的担忧包括港口、互联互通和战略准入，并且美国将越来越多地从中国与俄罗斯更广泛的战略联盟的角度来解读中国在北极地区的作用。

“围绕关键矿产、能源和北方基础设施的竞争可能会加剧，尤其是在商业项目与国家安全、盟国领土和供应链韧性重叠的情况下，”马达尔沙希说。

“随着气候变化提升北极的战略价值，这种地缘经济层面可能会进一步扩大。”

图片：南华早报。资料来源：牛津分析公司、国家冰雪数据中心。

华南理工大学公共政策研究院副研究员李品保表示，3月份在杭州举行的会议表明，中美两国在气候监测和公海渔业管理等不太敏感的问题上拥有“不可替代的共同利益”（irreplaceable common interests）。

但他表示，还有其他一些领域问题更大，例如美国总统唐纳德·特朗普威胁要占领格陵兰岛，华盛顿将北极视为大国竞争新战场的战略，以及将中俄在北极的合作视为“威胁”。

李品保说：“中美在北极的关系正在进入更深的水域：竞争强度不断上升，但功能性合作依然保持韧性。”

“真正需要关注的风险是，如果美国继续将北极事务与更广泛的中美战略竞争紧密联系起来，可能会阻碍一些合作机制，并逐渐缩小原本有助于建立互信的渠道。”

在杭州会议召开前几天，美国空军上将、北方司令部司令格雷戈里·吉洛特（Gregory Guillot）在国会听证会上表示，美国正在与丹麦谈判，以获得在格陵兰岛的三个额外基地的使用权。

这将标志着美国在冷战结束后缩减军事存在数十年来，首次在该地区进行军事扩张。

特朗普以中国和俄罗斯构成的所谓威胁为由，多次公开表示想要占领格陵兰岛，这促使丹麦及其一些欧洲盟友在今年早些时候向格陵兰岛派遣了军队和装备，以防遭到攻击。

4月23日，美国在华盛顿举办了一次会议，邀请了除俄罗斯以外的所有北极沿岸国家的高级外交代表——被称为“北极七国”（A7）——讨论在海洋中的“共同经济和安全利益”。

在特朗普的第一任期内，时任国务卿迈克·蓬佩奥指责中国在北极地区有“侵略性行为模式”，而对北京意图的怀疑一直延续到乔·拜登的总统任期。

2026年3月15日在挪威奥斯陆举行的“加拿大—北欧峰会”。加拿大总理马克·卡尼访问挪威，并与挪威、丹麦、瑞典、芬兰、冰岛五个北欧国家领导人会晤。会议主题主要是加强北极安全、防务合作等。图源：路透社

2022年《美国北极地区国家战略》（US National Strategy for the Arctic Region）和五角大楼2024年《北极战略》（Arctic Strategy）都强调了华盛顿对中国在该地区日益增长的影响力的疑虑，以及加强在该地区存在以保护国家安全的必要性。

今年早些时候，北约欧洲最高指挥官阿莱克西斯·格林克维奇（Alexus Grynkewich）也曾警告说，跨大西洋联盟应该“注意”俄罗斯和中国在北极地区日益密切的合作。

李警告说，如果美国持续以“过度安全化”的视角来看待中国的科学活动或中俄合作，可能会“加剧安全困境，甚至增加摩擦的风险”。

他还补充说，华盛顿及其盟友为阻止中国参与北极通信和港口开发而采取的措施，可能会“使商业竞争带上更浓厚的意识形态色彩”。

李还表示，中国与北极国家（除美国和俄罗斯外，还包括加拿大、丹麦、冰岛、挪威、瑞典和芬兰）在北极航运路线的法律适用性和资源开发的环境标准等规则制定问题上存在不同看法。

他说：“诸如‘公海’与‘内水’之类的分类争议仍然是未来争论的焦点。”

但他表示，在冷战高峰时期，美国和苏联曾就该地区的环境保护问题进行过讨论，并补充说，“今天的中国和美国在北极地区应该有更广泛的合作空间”。

“作为世界两大经济体和温室气体排放大国，中美两国在北极气候监测和碳循环研究方面拥有超越地缘政治的共同利益。”

他还指出，在海上安全以及渔业和生态系统保护等其他领域，存在着“相当大的”合作空间。

在北冰洋进行科学考察的“雪龙2”号。图源：新华社

上海国际问题研究院国际战略与安全研究所所长赵隆认为，中美两国在北极问题上可能存在更多合作空间，而非竞争空间。

“我认为中国和美国在北极安全问题上不存在任何直接的利益分歧，”他说。

赵隆还表示，特朗普对气候变化缺乏关注以及削减科研经费可能会促使美国科学家寻求与其他国家（包括中国）在北极研究方面更紧密合作的方式。

他还表示，特朗普对北极能源和资源开发的强烈热情可能会为美国与中国的合作创造“新的增长点”，因为中国对多元化燃料进口的需求可能会继续增长。

赵隆补充说，结束乌克兰战争可能为中国与北欧国家在北极航运路线上更紧密的合作铺平道路。

他还表示，必须消除“关于中国的错误叙述和误解”，包括有关中国正在扩大其在该地区的军事存在、试图与俄罗斯共同主导北极治理或利用其他国家之间的分歧的说法。

“我们应该努力使北极成为大国之间建设性接触和互动的前沿阵地，而不是让它沦为大国对抗的前线，”他补充道。

不过，赵隆表示，“北极特殊论”的时代——即认为环境至关重要的极地地区是一个独特的地方，在很大程度上不受外界安全紧张局势的影响——已经结束，竞争与合作将并行发展。

2025年3月28日，美国副总统万斯和夫人参观位于格陵兰岛的美国军事基地皮图菲克太空基地。图源：AP

李品保表示，北极地区未来人口密度增加“几乎不可避免”，中国或许有机会进一步明确其在北极地区的作用。

他说： “中国应继续保持战略重点，深化科学合作，遵守国际法，并在自身能力范围内提供公共产品。”

他还呼吁在北极地区的中国企业更加重视环境、社会和治理标准以及透明度，并加强与土著社区的互动。

马达尔沙希还表示，气候变化可能为中美之间开展有限但有意义的合作创造一个强有力的理由。

她表示：“中国在北极理事会的观察员地位以及现有的多边框架表明，即使在竞争激烈的环境中，有选择的合作仍然是可能的，也是必要的。”

原文题为“Will warming Arctic trigger further chill in US-China relations or bring them closer?”，作者为Orange Wang，《南华早报》中国高级记者

*以下为原英文报道，供读者对照参考（请上下滑动查看）。

US President Donald Trump’s landmark visit to China comes as the Iran war disrupts global energy supplies, fuels economic uncertainty and adds fresh strain to Washington-Beijing ties. In the first part of a series examining how rivalry, interdependence and geopolitical crises are reshaping the relationship between the two powers, we look at the Arctic as an arena for competition.

The Arctic is heating up, both physically and in terms of geopolitics.

As Arctic warming accelerates and sea ice declines to record or near-record lows, the region is becoming more accessible for shipping and resource extraction – something that also fuels great power rivalry.

The competition between China and the United States in the polar region is expected to intensify, but analysts said “functional” cooperation would still be necessary and may yet prove more important.

Events such as the Strait of Hormuz crisis, attacks by Yemen’s Houthi rebels on Red Sea shipping in solidarity with Gaza and even the temporary closure of the Suez Canal in 2021, when a cargo ship became stuck, have highlighted the importance of the Arctic as a potential alternative sea lane.

However, the increasingly heated China-US rivalry has also raised concerns that an area once described by former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev as a “zone of peace” may be becoming a new frontier for the strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing.

Apart from shipping, the region is also becoming more accessible for scientific research, infrastructure development and resource extraction, but this may fuel further competition and mistrust, according to Mehri Madarshahi, an honorary professor at the South China University of Technology’s Institute of Public Policy.

“The future trajectory of China-US relations in the Arctic is likely to be shaped by a paradox: climate change is opening the region physically while closing it politically,” she said.

A study published last September by Peking University’s Shenzhen Graduate School predicted that by 2100 the Arctic could support year-round navigation for all major vessel types, allowing different routes across the ocean to handle a greater portion of global shipping traffic than the Suez or Panama canals.

Beijing identified the future importance of the Arctic in a 2018 white paper that described China as an “important stakeholder” in the region and a “near-Arctic state”. It has also been steadily expanding its role in governance and scientific expeditions in polar regions.

The same year it worked with nine other parties, including the US, to conclude the landmark Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean.

The pact is the world’s first legally binding multilateral instrument to prevent commercial fishing starting in a high-seas area and is also the only international mechanism in the Arctic where Beijing has an equal say in decision-making.

The country is also an observer with no voting rights in the Arctic Council, which has stalled since Russia – one of its eight members – launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

In late March, China hosted a meeting of the fisheries pact’s scientific coordinating group in the eastern city of Hangzhou, a move the government described as “elevating its engagement in Arctic affairs”.

Beijing also hopes to develop more shipping routes and infrastructure under the Polar Silk Road, a part of its transcontinental Belt and Road Initiative.

Madarshahi said Washington would be wary about giving non-Arctic states such as China a greater role in regional affairs.

“As trust declines, scientific presence may be viewed through a security lens,” she said, arguing that research stations, icebreakers, seabed mapping and data collection could also have a wider strategic significance.

She also said that US concerns included ports, connectivity and strategic access and that it would increasingly interpret China’s Arctic role through its broader strategic alignment with Russia.

“Rivalry could sharpen around critical minerals, energy and northern infrastructure, especially where commercial projects overlap with national security, allied territory and supply-chain resilience,” Madarshahi said.

“This geoeconomic dimension is likely to expand as climate change increases the Arctic’s strategic value.”

The March meeting in Hangzhou showed China and the US shared “irreplaceable common interests” on less sensitive issues such as climate monitoring and high-seas fisheries management, according to Li Pinbao, an associate research fellow at the Institute of Public Policy.

But he said there were other areas that were more problematic, citing US President Donald Trump’s threats to take over Greenland, Washington’s strategy of framing the Arctic as a new arena for great-power competition and its view of China-Russia cooperation there as a “threat”.

Li said: “China-US relations in the Arctic are entering deeper waters: the intensity of competition is rising but functional cooperation remains resilient.

“The real risk to watch is that if the United States continues to hard-link Arctic affairs with the broader China-US strategic competition, it could stall some cooperative mechanisms and gradually narrow the channels that could otherwise help build mutual trust.”

Days before the meeting in Hangzhou, Gregory Guillot, a US Air Force general and head of Northern Command, told a congressional hearing that the country was negotiating with Denmark for access to three additional bases in Greenland.

That would mark the first US military expansion there in decades after scaling back its military presence at the end of the Cold War.Citing alleged threats posed by China and Russia, Trump has repeatedly broadcast his desire to take over Greenland, prompting Denmark and some of its European allies to send troops and equipment there earlier in the year in case of attack.

The US on April 23 hosted a gathering in Washington of senior diplomatic representatives from all Arctic littoral states excluding Russia – dubbed the Arctic Seven (A7) – to discuss “shared economic and security interests” in the ocean.

During Trump’s first term of office, then secretary of state Mike Pompeo accused China of a “pattern of aggressive behaviour” in the Arctic, and the suspicion of Beijing’s intentions continued into Joe Biden’s presidency.

The 2022 US National Strategy for the Arctic Region and the Pentagon’s 2024 Arctic Strategy both highlighted Washington’s suspicions about China’s growing presence in the region and the need for an enhanced presence to protect national security.

Nato’s top European commander Alexus Grynkewich also warned earlier this year that the transatlantic alliance should “be mindful of” Russia and China increasingly working together in the Arctic region.

Li warned that if the US were to persistently frame Chinese scientific activities or China-Russian cooperation through an “overly securitised” lens, that could “intensify security dilemmas and even raise the risk of friction”.

He added that Washington and its allies’ efforts to counter Chinese participation in Arctic communications and port development could risk “infusing commercial competition with greater ideological overtones”.

Li also said that China and the Arctic states – which apart from the US and Russia also include Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland – had different views on rule-setting issues such as legal applicability for Arctic shipping routes and environmental standards for resource development.

“Disputes over classifications such as ‘high seas’ versus ‘internal waters’ remain a focal point of future contestation,” he said.

But he said the US and Soviet Union had been able to discuss environmental protection for the region at the height of the Cold War, adding “today’s China and the US should have even broader room for cooperation in the Arctic”.

“As the world’s two largest economies and major greenhouse gas emitters, China and the US share common interests in Arctic climate monitoring and carbon cycle research that transcend geopolitics.”

He also pointed out the “considerable” scope for cooperation on maritime safety along with other areas such as fisheries and protecting the ecosystem.

China and the US are likely to find more room for cooperation than competition on Arctic issues, according to Zhao Long, the director of the Institute for International Strategic and Security Studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies.

“I don’t think there are any direct differences of interest … between China and the US on Arctic security issues,” he said.

Zhao also said Trump’s lack of concern over climate change and cuts to scientific funding might prompt US scientists to look for ways to work more closely with other countries, including China, on Arctic research.

He also said Trump’s strong enthusiasm for Arctic energy and resource development could create a “new growth point” for US cooperation with China, whose demand for diversified fuel imports may continue to grow.

Zhao added that an end to the war in Ukraine could open the way for closer cooperation between China and Nordic countries on Arctic shipping routes.

He also said it was important to dispel “false narratives and misconceptions about China”, including claims that it was expanding its military presence in the region, trying to dominate Arctic governance with Russia or exploit divisions among other countries.

“[We should] strive to make the Arctic a frontier for constructive engagement and interaction between major powers, not let it descend into a frontline of great-power confrontation,” he added.

Still, Zhao said the age of “Arctic exceptionalism” – the idea that the environmentally crucial polar region is a unique place that is largely immune to security tensions in the outside world – was over, and competition and cooperation would now evolve in parallel.

Li said that it was “almost inevitable” that the Arctic would become increasingly crowded in the future and there may be opportunities for China to further define its role there.

“[China] should continue to maintain strategic focus, deepen scientific engagement, act in accordance with international law and provide public goods where its capacity allows,” he said.

He also called for Chinese enterprises in the Arctic to place greater emphasis on environmental, social and governance standards and transparency, as well as engaging with indigenous communities.

Madarshahi also said climate change could create a strong case for limited but meaningful cooperation between China and the US.

“China’s observer status in the Arctic Council and existing multilateral frameworks show that even in a competitive environment, selective cooperation remains both possible and necessary,” she said.

原报道于5月7日刊登于《南华早报》官网，原标题为“Will warming Arctic trigger further chill in US-China relations or bring them closer?”。小标题为编辑自拟，原报道中相关背景内容有所调整补充。

受访人

梅赫里·马达尔沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）

华南理工大学公共政策研究院（IPP）荣誉教授、联合国教科文组织下属国际创意与可持续发展中心（ICCSD）顾问委员会成员

李品保

华南理工大学公共政策研究院 副研究员

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华南理工大学公共政策研究院（IPP）是一个独立、非营利性的知识创新与公共政策研究平台。IPP围绕中国的体制改革、社会政策、中国话语权与国际关系等开展一系列的研究工作，并在此基础上形成知识创新和政策咨询协调发展的良好格局。IPP的愿景是打造开放式的知识创新和政策研究平台，成为领先世界的中国智库。