期刊GRIR 2026年第2期目录及摘要｜保险学术前沿

声明：本系列文章基于原期刊目录和摘要内容整理而得，仅限于读者交流学习。如有侵权，请联系删除。

期刊介绍：

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review（《日内瓦风险与保险评论》，简称GRIR）是由日内瓦协会（The Geneva Association）出版的学术期刊，同时也是欧洲风险与保险经济学家协会（European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists）的官方期刊。GRIR的研究范围广泛，包括保险产品和市场的经济学、不确定性下的决策理论、个人、公司和社会的风险分担或风险缓解机制。特别关注与风险分担和缓解机制相关的市场失灵问题，例如由信息摩擦和激励问题引起的市场失灵，以及政府在通过监管或社会保险提供风险管理方面的作用。期刊的出版周期为每年两期，分别在3月和9月发布。

本期看点：

●金融知识（尤其是对风险分散的理解）与家庭财务韧性密切相关：理解风险分散的受访者显著更不容易陷入财务脆弱，且这一关系在控制人口统计和财务特征后依然成立。

●转分保机制能够缓解“跟随领头人”实践中领头再保险人为规避赢家诅咒而压低报价的问题，促使报价更激进、重新分配盈余，并通过信息传递渠道使客户受益。

●在参数化保险下，更精确的信息结构能够减小基差风险，但基差风险较小并不必然意味着保险覆盖更有效率。

●历史自然灾害频率较高的地区，现代家庭购买商业保险的倾向更强；这种持久影响可能源于风险容忍度、风险感知和外部风险分担模式上的长期差异。

●失效决策和复效决策均受到逆向选择的影响：风险较低的保单更可能失效（逆向选择/逆保留），而复效保单的后续理赔概率高于持续有效保单，且失效时间越长、复效后理赔概率越高。

●在存在风险相互依赖、预防投资信息不对称且监控成本高昂的情况下，企业会预防投资不足；当溢出不可观测且发生可能性很高时，网络外部性会加剧这一投资不足问题，而对溢出损失引入责任可在溢出风险较大时缓解该问题。

※ 本期目录

●金融素养与风险素养的重要性：来自多年数据的经验教训

●再保险的拍卖设计

●最优参数化保险的设计

●从灾难到保障：历史自然灾害如何通过风险动态塑造现代家庭商业保险参与

●健康保险中的失效、复效与逆向选择

●当损失相互依赖且理赔监控成本高昂时的预防：一个针对网络风险的应用

The importance of financial and risk literacy: lessons from many years of data

金融素养与风险素养的重要性：来自多年数据的经验教训

作者

Annamaria Lusardi（美国斯坦福商学院），Gavin McDonell（美国加利福尼亚大学），Andrea Sticha（美国斯坦福商学院）

摘要：Financial literacy has been measured systematically in the USA for more than two decades, beginning with the development of the Big Three financial literacy questions on compound interest, inflation, and risk diversification. This article reviews what this long-standing body of research has established about financial and risk literacy and presents updated evidence from the 2024 National Financial Capability Study. Across surveys, countries, and time, one finding has remained especially persistent: Risk diversification is the concept respondents understand least well. Risk knowledge also varies substantially by age, gender, education, race and ethnicity, and household income. We further examine its relationship with financial fragility, a measure developed following the 2008 financial crisis to assess households’ ability to withstand an unexpected expense. Respondents who understand risk diversification are substantially less likely to be financially fragile, and this finding remains significant after accounting for demographic and financial characteristics. These latest results reinforce a broad body of evidence showing that financial knowledge, and risk comprehension in particular, is closely related to household financial resilience. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for financial education, teaching, and policy.

美国对金融素养进行系统性测量已有二十多年，始于“三大金融素养问题”的开发，这三个问题分别涉及复利、通货膨胀和风险分散。本文回顾了这一长期研究体系在金融素养与风险素养方面所确立的发现，并呈现了来自2024年“国家金融能力研究”的最新证据。纵观不同调查、不同国家和不同时期，有一个发现始终尤为突出：风险分散是受访者理解得最差的概念。风险知识还因年龄、性别、教育程度、种族与族裔以及家庭收入的不同而存在显著差异。我们进一步考察了风险知识与“财务脆弱性”之间的关系。财务脆弱性是2008年金融危机后开发的一项衡量指标，用于评估家庭应对意外支出的能力。理解风险分散的受访者，其陷入财务脆弱的可能性显著更低；在控制了人口统计特征和财务特征之后，这一发现依然显著。这些最新结果进一步印证了大量证据所表明的观点：金融知识，尤其是风险理解能力，与家庭财务韧性密切相关。最后，我们讨论了这项研究对金融教育、教学和政策的启示。

原文链接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s10713-026-00120-y

Auction design for reinsurance

再保险的拍卖设计

作者

Chang Liu（中央财经大学）

摘要：This study models competing reinsurance syndicates in a common-value setting. Under the follow-the-lead practice, the lead reinsurer makes an offer to the client, while followers provide capacity at the single unit price set at the tender stage. To reconcile regulators’ call for more independent bidding by non-leads with participants’ informational constraints, we consider a retrocession mechanism in which the lead underwrites the contract and later cedes part of the risk with offer disclosure. In the follow-the-lead practice, lead reinsurers shade their offers to avoid the winner’s curse, whereas retrocession encourages more aggressive offers, redistributes surplus, and benefits clients through an information transmission channel.

本研究在共同价值环境下对相互竞争的再保险辛迪加进行建模。在“跟随领头人”实践中，领头再保险人向客户提出报价，而跟随者则按招标阶段设定的单一单位价格提供承保能力。为了协调监管机构对非领头方更独立投标的呼吁与参与方面临的信息约束，我们考察了一种转分保机制：由领头承保人承保合同，随后在披露报价的情况下将部分风险分出。在“跟随领头人”实践中，领头再保险人会压低报价以避免赢家诅咒；而转分保则鼓励更激进的报价，重新分配盈余，并通过信息传递渠道使客户受益。

原文链接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s10713-026-00112-y

On the design of optimal parametric insurance

最优参数化保险的设计

作者

Alexis Louaas（法国巴黎综合理工学院）& Pierre Picard（法国巴黎综合理工学院）

摘要：Under parametric insurance, the indemnity is a function of a publicly-observable parameter vector correlated with the loss incurred by the policyholder. The parameter vector yields a loss index, which is the conditional expected value of the loss, the basis risk being the random difference between the actual loss and the loss index. We analyze how the design of the optimal parametric insurance contract depends on whether the parameter vector and the basis risk are independently distributed or not. We also show that a more accurate information structure reduces the size of the basis risk, but that a smaller basis risk is not the guarantee of a more efficient insurance coverage.

在参数化保险下，赔付金额是某一公开可观测参数向量的函数，该参数向量与被保险人遭受的损失相关。该参数向量产生一个损失指数，即损失的条件期望值，而基差风险则是实际损失与损失指数之间的随机差额。我们分析了最优参数化保险合同的设计如何取决于参数向量与基差风险是否独立分布。我们还表明，更精确的信息结构会降低基差风险的规模，但基差风险较小并不保证保险覆盖更有效率。

原文链接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s10713-026-00113-x

From calamity to coverage: How historical natural disasters shape modern household commercial insurance participation through risk dynamics

从灾难到保障：历史自然灾害如何通过风险动态塑造现代家庭商业保险参与

作者

Weihua Yu（西安交通大学）& Jinfei Niu（西安交通大学）

摘要：The impact of historical natural disasters continues to resonate in the present day. This paper investigates how natural disasters during China’s Ming and Qing dynasties have shaped modern household participation in commercial insurance. Our findings indicate that regions with a higher frequency of historical natural disasters tend to exhibit a greater propensity for purchasing commercial insurance, which can be related to enduring differences in individuals’ risk tolerance, risk perception, and external risk-sharing patterns. To further assess potential bias, we use climate seasonality as instrumental variables to test the robustness of the observed associations. These findings highlight the lasting influence of historical shocks on contemporary decision-making, illustrating the intersection of behavioral and institutional legacies in shaping conservative risk management practices today.

历史自然灾害的影响至今仍在持续回响。本文研究了明清时期的自然灾害如何塑造了现代家庭的商业保险参与行为。我们的研究发现表明，历史自然灾害发生频率较高的地区，往往表现出更强的商业保险购买倾向，这可能与个体在风险容忍度、风险感知以及外部风险分担模式方面长期存在的差异有关。为了进一步评估潜在偏误，我们使用气候季节性作为工具变量，检验了所观察到的关联的稳健性。这些发现凸显了历史冲击对当代决策的持久影响，也说明了行为遗产与制度遗产在塑造当今保守型风险管理实践中的交汇。

原文链接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s10713-026-00114-w

Lapse, reinstatement, and adverse selection in health insurance

健康保险中的失效、复效与逆向选择

作者

Wen-Yen Hsu（逢甲大学），Gene Lai（美国北卡罗来纳大学夏洛特分校），Karen C. Su（国立台中科技大学）& Mike Hoy（加拿大圭尔夫大学）

摘要：This paper examines whether adverse selection exists in decisions by policyholders who allow their policies to lapse and then reinstate them, respectively. We find that lapse policies have lower pre-lapse claim experience than those that are continuously in-force, indicating that policies with lower risk are more likely to lapse. This result implies that lapse decisions are subject to adverse selection/retention. Because policies reinstated after six months are subject to limited underwriting, we separated reinstated policies into two groups: those reinstated within six months group and those reinstated after six months group. The evidence shows that reinstated policies both have higher subsequent claim probability than those that are continuously-in-force. These results imply that reinstatement decisions are subject to adverse selection. Finally, we also find that the longer the policy lapse prior to reinstatement, the higher the claim probability. This observation is consistent with continued negative health shock/changes being experienced by some individuals following the six-month period after lapsation.

本文考察了保单持有人分别作出保单失效和复效决策时是否存在逆向选择。我们发现，失效保单在失效前的理赔经验低于持续有效的保单，这表明风险较低的保单更可能失效。这一结果意味着失效决策受到逆向选择/逆保留的影响。由于失效六个月后复效的保单须经过有限的核保，我们将复效保单分为两组：六个月以内复效组和六个月以后复效组。证据显示，复效保单的后续理赔概率均高于持续有效保单。这些结果意味着复效决策受到逆向选择的影响。最后，我们还发现，保单在复效前的失效时间越长，理赔概率越高。这一观察结果与某些个体在保单失效六个月后持续经历负面健康冲击/变化的情况相一致。

原文链接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s10713-026-00116-8

Prevention when losses are interdependent and claims are costly monitored: an application to cyber risks

当损失相互依赖且理赔监控成本高昂时的预防：一个针对网络风险的应用

作者

M. Martin Boyer（加拿大蒙特利尔大学）& Elisabeth Vigneron（德国慕尼黑大学）

摘要：We examine how risk interdependence—characterized by interdependent network security and spillover losses—affects investment in prevention of a risk averse and insured firm under three conditions: (1) the firm has private information about its level of preventive investment; (2) the insurer can observe this investment only by incurring a monitoring cost; and (3) the firm may be held liable for spillover losses. In equilibrium, firms will underinvest in prevention compared to when risks are independent. When spillovers are unobservable and highly likely, network externalities exacerbate the underinvestment problem. In contrast, when spillovers are observable or unlikely, network externalities do not materially affect the investment in prevention. The introduction of liability for spillover losses can mitigate the underinvestment problem when the spillover risk is substantial. We apply this framework to the case of cyber risk.

我们考察风险相互依赖——其特征为网络安全的相互依赖和溢出损失——如何影响一个风险厌恶且已投保的企业的预防投资，具体在以下三个条件下：（1）企业对其预防投资水平拥有私人信息；（2）保险人只能通过承担监控成本来观察这一投资；（3）企业可能需对溢出损失承担责任。在均衡状态下，与风险相互独立时相比，企业会预防投资不足。当溢出不可观测且发生可能性很高时，网络外部性会加剧投资不足问题。相反，当溢出可观测或不太可能发生时，网络外部性不会对预防投资产生实质性影响。当溢出风险很大时，引入对溢出损失的责任可以缓解投资不足问题。我们将这一框架应用于网络风险的情形。

原文链接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s10713-026-00115-9